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Saul Kripke, in his paper " A puzzle about belief", tells us a story about
Pierre, a story which could easily be true in the world as we know it.
The story doesn't contain any so-called twin worlds or molecule-to-
molecule identical people. In this respect it is more innocent than many
other philosophical thought experiments of the recent past. But even
without any such dramatic devices it seems to point to possibilities-
and what is more, to "realistic" possibilities-which seem to contain a
lot of philosophical dynamite.
I shall suppose that Pierre's story is, by now, common knowledge
among philosophers and therefore a short reminder will do. Pierre was
anormal speaker of French, before he moved to London and learnt
English without ever using any dictionary or similar devices. During
his time in France he had heard about London, and because of what he
had heard, he acquired the disposition to assent to the sentence " Londres
est jolie", a disposition he still has. After a time in England, he becomes
anormal speaker of English, and what he has seen of London inclines
him to assent to the sentence "London is not pretty".l He fails to no-
Let me mention one aspect of this story which may seem dubious. It is of some
importance for Kripke's considerations that Pierre is anormal speaker of English
and French. But given Pierre's peculiar linguistic history and given, in particular,
his lack of knowledge concerning the fact that the city he refers to as " Londres",
when he speaks French, is London, the city he refers to as "London", when he
speaks English-given this, can he really be considered anormal speaker of English
and French?
Kripke assumes this point without arguing it in detail, and I think he is right.
Pierre is anormal speaker of Epglish, in the sense employed by Kripke: When
Pierre uses normal sentences of English for the normallinguistic purposes of ask-
ing, giving information etc., the words he uses have just the sense and reference
they would in the mouths of other normal speakers of English. He also, and for
corresponding reasons, is anormal speaker of French.-Nevertheless, it has to be
conceded that there is a reading of the phrase "a normal speaker of English and
Andreas Kemmerling120
tice that the city he refers to as " Londres" when he speaks French is the
sarne city as the one he refers to as "London" when he speaks English.
Let us assurne that he sometimes says "London is not pretty" when
conversing with his English friends, and that he sometimes says " Londres
est jolie" when talking to his French friends. We seem to be compelled,
by accepted principles of our ordinary practice of belief astriptioq, to
say that he believes that London is not pretty ( on the strength of his
assent to "London is not pretty"); at the sarne time, we seem com-
pelled to say that he believes that London is pretty (on the strength of
his assent to " Londres est jolie")}
What exactly is the puzzle allegedly contained in the story? Kripke,
in the title of his paper, calls it a puzzle about belief, and in the opening
sentence a puzzle about narnes and belief.3 So is it a puzzle about the
common concept ofbelief?4 Or about the semantic role of proper narnes(like "London" and " Londres") in belief-sentences ?5 Or about strange
results of the application of what appear to be uncontroversial prin-
ciples for the ascription of beliefs ?6 Or about the conceptual relation-
ship between rationality and holding beliefs which appear to be straight-
forwardly contradictory ?7
The extensive literature on Kripke's story about Pierre shows that it
inspires thoughts about everything that I have just mentioned. And
part of what makes it such a fascinating story is that it is simple and
innocent, yet still has so many puzzling features. In the following,
I shall concentrate on one aspect of the puzzle, which concerns the
epistemology ofbelief ascription. The question I shall address is whether
we are compelled, by our ordinary practice of belief ascription, to as-
cribe to Pierre the belief that London is not pretty on the strength of
French" in which it may not apply to Pierre. He may not be a normal bilingual
speaker of English and French. Yet in this there lurks no difficulty which concems
us here. The principles of belief ascription to which Kripke appeals require only
that Pierre is anormal speaker of English and anormal speaker of French. It is
irrelevant if he is a normal bilingual.
2 Kripke (1979), p. 257.
3 Kripke (1979), p. 239.
4 This is what K. Donnellan (1989) argues for.
5 See, e.g., D. Lewis (1981), B. Loar (1987) and D. Sosa (1996).
6 See, e.g.,J.I. Biro (1984) and D.E. Over (1983) who claimthatKripke misapplies
the principle of disquotation and the principle of translation, respectively. Accord-
ing to J. G. Moore (1999), Kripke fails to observe that the application of the prin-
ciple of disquotation is not a mechanical matter but has to be guided by
"contextualist" considerations.
7 See, e.K., R.B. Marcus (1981) and N. Feit (2001).
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his assenting to the sentence "London is not pretty" ( or the belief that
London is pretty on the strength of his assent to " Londres est jolie") .
I shall try to show that we have no principled justification for ascribing
to Pierre either of the two beliefs, and moreover that we have some
reason to assume that he does not have either of them.
Let me make it clear right at the beginning that my aim is not pri-
marily to solve or dissolve the puzzle about belief. Nevertheless, if what
I shall argue is correct, then the puzzle as it has been presented by
Kripke himself does not arise. But this is not meant to point to the
"real" or "ultimate" solution of the puzzle. If a similar type of case
could be created even without any principle of disquotation,8 then this
would not affect what I want to argue for in this paper. What 1 shall
take issue with is Kripke' s principle of disquotation and how it is ap-
plied in creating the puzzle.9 This principle, its peculiar epistemologi-
cal status and its special justificatory role in belief ascription are of philo-
sophical interest in their own right; in particular, it is instructive, I hope,
to see why it is not applicable in a case like the one of Kripke's Pierre.
My argument will run as follows. I replace Kripke's disquotational
principle by a modified version and then argue that this modified prin-
ciple cannot be invoked to justify the ascription of the belief that Lon-
don is not pretty (or of the belief that London is pretty) to Pierre. It
cannot be invoked because Pierre's case is abnormal; and I shall defend
this claim against the charge of being ad hoc. Moreover, I shall argue
that Pierre does not express the belief that London is not pretty by his
assent to "London is not pretty", and, more generally, that there is no
principled justification for ascribing to Pierre, or denying him, the be-
liefs in question. N evertheless, there is some reason to think that he
does not have these beliefs. In the second part of the paper I sketch a
generalline of defence for the suggested revision of the disquotational
principle: It belongs to a family of conceptually true generalizations of
which it is characteristic that they contain a general normality con-
straint essentially. In sections 6 and 7, I shall try to refute Kripke' s spe-
cific arguments against denying that Pierre believes that London is
pretty/not pretty.
D. Sosa (1996, p. 384) tries to show that it can. But seeJ. G. Moore (1999, pp. 359f.)
for reasons to doubt that Sosa's attempt is successful.
I shall not be concerned here with Kripke's principle of translation which he em-
ploys in ascribing to Pierre the belief that London is pretty onthe strength of his
assent to " LondTes est iolie".
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1. A modification of the disquotational principle
Kripke states his so-called disquotational principle as follows :
If anormal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to "p",
then he believes that p. (Where "p" is to be replaced inside and out-
side all quotation marks by any appropriate standard English sen-
tence.)10
This is not exactly right as it stands since an important qualification is
missing, which is, as I shall argue in sections 4 and 5, characteristic of
all generalizations of this kind: namely a qualification concerning over-
all normality of the circumstances. The principle would at least have to
be modified in the following way:
If anormal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to "p",
then, ceteris paribus11, he believes that p.
Adding an overall normality constraint, the ceteris paribus clause, to a
generalization is not in itself a way of making the generalization im-
mune to falsification. Rather it is a way of drawing adistinction among
possible counterinstances: a distinction between those which are genu-
ine falsifications and those yet unthought-of interferences which should
not be considered as falsifications. A generalization like " Ceteris pari-
bus, ripe lemons are yellow" is not falsified by ripe lemons which have
been painted blue, or by lemons which are blue because they were
exposed to some special kind of radiation during their ripening process
in a lab; but, in spite of the normality constraint, it would be genuinely
falsified, if we, e. g., hit upon a new sort of lemon which are blue when
ripe. A flexible all-purpose proviso like the ceteris paribus clause is ex-
actly what we need, whenever we have reason to believe that there are
10 Kripke (1979), pp. 248f. He adds: "The sentence replacing 'p' is to lack indexical
or pronominal devices or ambiguities, that would ruin the intuitive sense of the
principle".
11 Erudite readers have reminded me of the fact that, strictly literally speaking, the
term "ceterisparibus"is not exchangeable with "under overall normal conditions".
Strictly speaking, "ceteris paribus " is a qualifier designed only for contrastive state-
ments like: "Of any two Rolling Stones fans, one male and one female, the male
willlike Keith's singing better than the female". It is not designed to qualify a
statement like "Whenever an iron rod is heated, it expands".-But since, alas,
nobody seems to care, I prefer not to care either. I have chosen "ceteris paribus"
because it seems to be the most indeterminate normality-operator in current philo-
sophical use. Read it as saying: "given overall normal conditions" or "with some
qualification concerning overall normality".
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possible counterinstances which would not genuinely falsify the gener-
alization "as it is meant in the fIrst place" but have no hope of specify-
ing a comprehensive list of them in advance. The point of introducing
such a proviso is not to allow for ad hoc rejections of genuine falsifica-
tions (i. e., the hedged generalization must not be read as amounting
to: "Ripe lemonsare yellow, unless they aren't"), but rather for appro-
priate and balanced rejection of spurious falsifications.12
In applying this revised principle to Pierre, we have enough
ascriptionalleeway at hand to avoid the conclusion that he be1ieves
that London is not pretty, while still granting that he is anormal speaker
of English who, on reflection, sincerely assents to "London is not
pretty". (One terminological remark. For the sake of less convoluted
speech, I shall often just say "assent to" without mentioning explicitly
the qualifications of seriousness and reflectedness; so when I say in the
following of somebody that he assents to a sentence, this is to be un-
derstood as saying that he assents to it sincerely and on reflection.)
Let me repeat the point of the modification just introduced, for it is
crucial. The corrected version of the disquotational principle allows for
the following possibility: x is anormal speaker of Eng1ish; x assents to
"London is not pretty" ; but x does not believe that London is not pretty.
It allows for this possibility, because of the ceteris paribus clause. This
clause becomes pertinent in Pierre's case.
Why? Well, when Pierre assents to "London is not pretty", there is
at least one feature which is highly bewildering and deviant from nor-
mal cases. In fact, it is so bewildering and deviant that it should prevent
us from rashly conceding that he be1ieves that London is not pretty.
The feature which I have in mind is this: When Pierre assents to "Lon-
don is not pretty", he also, at the same moment, has the disposition to
assent to another sentence which I shall call a counter-sentence. Two
sentences, s and s'!-, are counter-sentences of each other (at context c) iff
assent to s ( at c) is, ceteris paribus, a way of expressing a particular inten-
tional attitude a, and assent to s'!- (at c) is, ceteris paribus, a way of ex-
pressing the lack of a.13 Correspondingly, I shall call the simultaneous
12 Let me emphasise that in saying this, I do not mean to address the thorny topic of
the appropriateness of ceteris paribus clauses in laws of the special sciences and in
physics. See Erkenntnis 57 (2002) for an excellent collection of papers which reflect
the current state of the debate on this issue. My remarks here only concern the use
of these clauses in generalizations as they occur in non-scientific discourse.
13 Both assenting to "It is not the case that p" and to "I do not believe that p" are
considered here as ways of expressing lack of belief that p. (Expressing disbelief
that p counts, ceteris paribus, as a way of expressing lack of belief that p.) I assume
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dispositions to assent to two such sentences counter-dispositions of each
other. And I shall call them attitudinal dispositions, because manifest-
ing them is, ceteris paribus, manifesting a particular intentional attitude
or the lack of it.
Now the crucial point is this. If somebody has, and is known to
have, both an attitudinal disposition and a counter-disposition of it,
then the attitude in question cannot be ascribed to him solelyon the
strength of manifesting the disposition. N either can the lack of the atti-
tude be ascribed to him solelyon the strength of manifesting the counter-
disposition. These two attitudinal dispositions cancel each other out,
as it were, as indicators of particular attitudes.
In the dialectical context ofKripke's puzzle, this claim may seem ad
hoc, reflecting nothing but a rationalistically prejudiced philosopher's
aversion to ascribing contradictory beliefs. Against this, two things
should be noted. First, the ascription of contradictory beliefs is not at
all ruled out thereby. What is denied is just this: that the disquotational
principle compels us to ascribe contradictory beliefs solelyon the strength
of assent to sentences towards which the speaker is known to be counter-
disposed. (If we allow for the possibility that anormal speaker who is
not relevantly counter-disposed may, on reflection, sincerely assent to
"p and it is not the case that p", then even the modified principle can be
invoked in order to ascribe contradictory beliefs.) Second, it is not phi-
losophical prejudice but rather appears to be a plain fact about our
common ordinary practice of Delief ascription that we would not ( con-
sider ourselves compelled to) ascribe a belief solelyon the strength of
assent if we knew (or had reason to think) that the assenter is counter-
disposed. More on this in a moment.
2. Does Pierre express the betiefs?
Questions about whether a subject expresses a certain belief (and whether
therefore this belief can be ascribed to hirn with principled justification)
should be distinguished from questions about whether the subject has
the belief in question. And these factual questions, whether someone
really has or expresses a certain belief, should also be distinguished from
that this pattern is valid not only of belief but of all propositional attitudes which
can be expressed, but nothing in the following depends on this assumption.-Are
"The morning star is visible in the sky" and "The evening star is not visible in the
sky" counter-sentences? I shouldn't say so, but if you prefer a less fme-grained
individuation of propositional attitudes, this will pose no problem for the considera-
tions in this paper.
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epistemological questions concerning the justification for ascribing this
belief to him or for claiming that he expresses it by what he does. These
distinctions are germane to the ensuing considerations, because I want
to argue that Pierre definitely does not express the belief that London
is not pretty by assenting to "London is not pretty" ; but that nothing
defmite can be said about whether Pierre holds this belief. And as re-
gards matters of justification, it is important to see that Pierre.s imag-
ined English listeners (who are part of the story) may be justified in
assuming that he expresses this belief by assenting to "London is not
pretty.. and therefore justified in ascribing to him this belief, whereas,
we-the readers ofKripke.s story who are in the know about his counter-
dispositions-are not justified in ascribing to him this belief, since we
know that he does not, despite all appearances, express this belief by
his assent.
Let me briefly elaborate on this last point first. In considering prob-
lems like the ones we are dealing with in this paper, it is of great impor-
tance to clearly distinguish two bodies of knowledge concerning the
situation to be analysed. On the one hand, there is the knowledge which
we, the external analysers, have about the situation; we know, for ex-
ample, that Pierre is disposed to assent to "Londres est jolie ». On the
other hand, there is the knowledge which they, the people who pOpU-
late the fictional situation described by Kripke, have about the situa-
tion. They, Pierre and his English audience,don.t know that he has any
counter-disposition to his assent to "London is not pretty». (Pierre may
know that he is disposed to assent to "Londres est jolie », but he does not
know that this is a counter-disposition of his disposition to assent to
"London is not pretty.' ; his audience may know that the two disposi-
tions are counter-dispositions of each other, but they do not know that
Pierre has both of them.) If we do not clearly distinguish between us
and them-when we, for example, surreptitiously imagine ourselves
being in their situation-, then we may easily get confused.
Having read Kripke.s story, we are, as I shall argue, in a position to
know that Pierre does not express the belief that London is not pretty,
when he assents to "London is not pretty.'. Yet they are perfectly justi-
fied in ascribing this belief to him on the strength of his assent. They
are perfectly justified in doing this, since Pierre.s assent, which they
mistakenly but justifiably consider anormal case of assent, creates a
presumption on their behalf that he believes that London is not pretty,
and there is no salient feature of the situation which could reasonably
stop them from making their judgement in accordance with this pre-
sumption. We are in a relevantly different epistemic situation. Informed
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by Kripke that Pierre is counter-disposed, we know that there is some-
thing abnormal involved, so his assent does not create such a presump-
tion on our behalf. To think otherwise is to confuse us with them. If
they knew what we know, they would not consider the case anormal
one; they would therefore not ascribe to Pierre the belief that London
is not pretty solelyon the strength of his assent to "London is not
pretty". They would, one may guess, ask Pierre "Now what is it that
you think about London ? To us you say that it is not pretty, to your
French friends you say that it is pretty. Tell us what you really think."
Kripke's story leaves it open what Pierre's considered answer would
be as soon as he has recognized that "Londres » and "London " are names
of the same city. And therefore, as I shall argue, it leaves it open whether
or not Pierre believes that London is pretty.
At the end of the first section I had mentioned the suspicion that the
claim that Pierre's assent is not anormal case of assent may be ad hoc.
Now it should be obvious both why it is not ad hoc and why it may
seem so in the dialectical context of Kripke's puzzle. It may seem ad
hoc because from the standpoint of anybody involved in the story,
Pierre's assenting is bound to appear to be a fully normal case. More-
over, the people in Kripke's story cannot be blamed for taking this case
as anormal one (after all, it took Kripke's ingenuity to discover this
remote possibility at all). The appearance of overall normality is not
due to amistake or some sort of epistemic negligence of Pierre or his
audience. So, given normal knowledge and due epistemic care con-
cerning the situation in which Pierre assents to "London is not pretty",
his assenting appears to be anormal case; hence it may easily seem to
be ad hoc to claim that it is not anormal case.-But nevertheless the
claim is not ad hoc. For it is quite generally true that counter-disposed-
ness is an abnormal feature in situations in which we want to ascribe
beliefs to people on the basis of what they say. Moreover, it is not "nor-
mal" knowledge of the situation which proves decisive for whether the
situation is normal, but rather complete knowledge of the relevant fea-
tures. Quite generally and independently of Pierre's particular case, if
we really knew, or were aware of a good reason to assume, that some-
body is prepared at the same time both to say that p and to say that
non-p, his sincerely saying the one thing or the other depending only
on whether he happens to speak English or French, then what he says
alone would not settle for us that he believes that p or non-p respec-
tively.
Now let us first consider the question whether Pierre, by assent-
ing to "London is not pretty" expresses the belief that London is not
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pretty.14 We should note right at the start that, even if he does not ex-
press this belief, it is still an open question whether he has it. Facts
about believing are quite independent from facts about belief-expres-
sion: One may have a belief but not express it, and vice versa.
Expressing a belief is more than merely providing any sort of evidence
whatever that one has the belief. Rather it is performing some action which
yields principled justification, of a special kind, for the ascription of the
belief. An ascription principle is any generalization of the kind "If some-
one does x, and such-and-such conditions are satisfied, then, given overa1l
normal conditions, he believes that p". What makes belief expression spe-
cial is the basic nature of the ascription principle (in virtue of which doing
x is an expressing of the belief that p). A basic ascription principle is, ftrst,
fully uncontroversial, a piece of common knowledge (i. e., it is accepted
by everyone, known to be so, etc.); and second, its truth is conceptual.15 If
we were to know that the antecedent of a basic ascription principle is
satisfied by S's doing x at t, and that the relevant conditions are satisfied
at t, we would be "forced" to admit: If overa1l normal conditions obtained
at t, S at t believed that p. And to the extent that we have no reason to
assurne the presence of anything abnormal, we are "forced" to ascribe S
the belief that p.-In brief, I suggest the following:
In doing x, S expresses the belief that p, iff (roughly) there is an accepted
conceptua1ly true principle of the type "Ifsomeone does x, and condi-
tions Cl,...,Cn are satisfied, then, ceteris paribus, he believes thatp", and
in doing x, S satisfies the antecedent of such a principle}6
14 Does a phrase of the form "the belief that ..." refer at all? Isn't there maybe some-
thing fishy about the definite article ? It can't be denied, as, e. g., Moore (1999) has
argued, that the same phrase of the type "the belief that p" or "... believes that p"
may denote different things relative to different contexts, even if "p" is not ambigu-
ous and contains no manifest indexicals or hidden parameters. It may even be that
what counts as believing varies from context to context. But shifts in context do
not playa role in the following. We consider Pierre as he assents to "London is not
pretty" and is disposed to assent to "Londres est jolie " in this very context. Andwe,
the ascribers, do not undergo a change of context when we consider the question
which beliefs can be ascribed to Pierre with principled justification. Hence for the
purposes of our discussion, there seem to be no "contextualist" obstacles to using
phrases like "the belief that London is pretty/not pretty".
15 Kripke (1979, pp. 249,263) says that the principle of disquotation appears to be a
self-evident truth. Being basic may explain why it seems se1f-evident.
16 For an elaboration of this account of belief expression see Kemmerling (2002) and
(2003).
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To express a belief, then, is to provide a particularly strong kind of evidence
for holding the belief in question. Someone who assents to the sentence "It' s
raining", satisfying the conditions of being sincere, not linguistically con-
fused, etc., expresses the belief that it's raining; whereas someone who
looks out of the window and subsequently puts on his raincoat before
leaving the house does not, in the sense just outlined, express this belief,
since there is no basic ascription principle to the effect that if someone does
so, then, ceterisparibus, he believes that it's raining. If someone looks out of
the window and then puts on a raincoat, this may be good evidence for his
believing that it' s raining, but it does not amount to his expressing this belief.
The first claim, then, is this: Pierre, in assenting to "London is not
pretty" does not express the belief that London is not pretty. And the
argument is this: (a) The modified disquotational principle cannot be
invoked for ascribing this belief to Pierre on the strength of his assent
(and his fulftlment of the conditions concerning sincerity, reflectedness,
etc.). It cannot be invoked for the reason mentioned: His case is ruled
out by the ceteris paribus clause of the principle, since he has a counteI'-
disposition (namely to assent to "Londres est jolie »). (b) There is no
other basic principle which could be invoked for ascribing this belief to
Pierre on the strength ofhis assenting to "Loi1don is not pretty". Obvi-
ously, it would be difficult to prove this negative existential statement.
But there is good reason for accepting it. For any other principle which
could be invoked would have to be extremely similar, in the relevant
respect, to the modified disquotational principle: it would have to peI'-
mit, given normal conditions, to ascribe the belief on the strength of
Pierre's sincere assent to the same sentence. And there is no reason to
assume that there is another basic principle of this kind. But in case this
support for (b) should seem too weak, here comes another reason:
Any other principle of this kind would have to contain a ceteris paribus
clause, and its application to Pierre's case would therefore lead to the
same result as the modified disquotational principle.
So given Kripke's story, Pierre does not express the belief that Lon-
don is not pretty. This does not establish that Pierre does not have this
belief. Kripke ascribes to him this belief as a result of applying an incor-
rect principle of belief ascription. But even if Kripke's reasons for as-
cribing the belief to Pierre are misguided, it may nevertheless be true
that Pierre holds the belief. Our result (that Pierre does not express the
belief) only entails that there is no principled justification for the as-
cription of this belief to him on the strength of his assent. But he may
nevertheless have it. Nothing Kripke says explicitly excludes this pOS-
sibilitv. And the storv is our onlv source of information about Pierre.
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Let me briefly sum up what I have said so far. We considered the
question whether Pierre, in assenting to "London is not pretty", ex-
presses the belief that London is not pretty. He expresses this belief iff
a basic ascription principle, which is applicable to his case of assenting
to this sentence, yields that he has the belief. Kripke assumes that there
is such a principle, namely his disquotational principle. But this prin-
ciple is not correct as stated by Kripke. The modified version contains
a ceteris paribus clause. And Pierre's case is a paradigm of a case in
which some relevant things are not normal, for Pierre's disposition to
assent to "London is not pretty" comes hand in hand with a counter-
disposition. Therefore the disquotational principle, in its modified ver-
sion, does not justify our ascription of the belief to Pierre on the strength
of his assenting to the sentence. And there is no other basic principle
which would justify such an ascription (by us) to Pierre in those cir-
cumstances. Hence we are to conclude that (on the strength ofnothing
but this) the belief that London is not pretty cannot be ascribed to
Pierre with principled justification, although he is anormal speaker
who assents to "London is not pretty".
Strictly analogous considerations lead to the result that when he
assents to "Londres est jolie », Pierre does not express the belief that Lon-
don is pretty. So we have no principled justification for ascribing to
him this belief either. But given these two negative results, we do not
have principled justification for denying him the two beliefs in ques-
tion. For, obviously, there are no basic principles of belief denial, ac-
cepted principles of the type "If someone does x, and conditions Cl, ...,Cn
are satisfied, then, ceteris paribus, he does not believe that p", which
could be invoked to ascribe to Pierre lack of belief on strength of his
assent to "London is not pretty" or "Londres est jolie ».
Therefore, as far as Kripke's story goes, there is no accepted prin-
ciple of belief ascription or belief denial which would justify any of the
following claims :
(1) Pierre believes that London is pretty.
(2) Pierre believes that London is not pretty.
(3) Pierre does not believe that London is pretty.
( 4) Pierre does not believe that London is not pretty.
Our standard practice of belief ascription and belief denial, insofar as it
is governed by accepted principles, is silent about the truth or falsity of
(1)-(4). In particular, we are not forced, by our standard practice, to
accept (1) and (2).
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Does this result make Kripke's story less puzzling? Yes, I think so.
At least in some respects. We don't have to ascribe to Pierre contradic-
tory beliefs about London's pulchritude. Moreover, we are not com-
mitted to contradictory claims about Pierre's beliefs, as we would be, if
we accepted the plausible principle "If S believes that non-p and is not
disposed to assent to ~', then S does not believe that p".17
3. Does Pierre have the beliefs?
We have no principled justification for any of the claims (1)-(4). Still
we may wonder if we have reason to consider certain of these claims
true. Kripke claims that (1) and (2) are true, as result of the application
of the disquotational principlel8, and he gives separate arguments for
the falsity of (3) and (4) which I shall consider in sections 6 and 7 be-
low. Against Kripke, a case can be made for the claim that (3) and (4)
are true. The reasoning is this. We cannot, with principled justification,
ascribe to Pierre the belief that London is not pretty on the strength of
his assenting to "London is not pretty". But as anormal speaker of
English, is there anything better he could do to express the very belief
that London is not pretty than assenting to this very sentence?19 No,
since assent to a sentence which means that p (and does not mean any-
thing else) is the best possible means for expressing the very belief that
p,2o If the best possible means isn't good enough to do the trick, no-
thing is. So we are left with two possibilities: either assuming that Pierre
holds the beliefbut is barred from expressing it, or assuming that Pierre
does not hold the belief.
The first option-of assuming that Pierre holds a very simple belief
which he cannot, given his current overall cognitive state, express, even
when he does the optimal thing for expressing it-is highly extravagant.
There might be inexpressible beliefs, but the belief that London is not
17 Kripke (1979, p. 255) says that Pierre is not disposed to assent to "London is pretty".
Given this and the plausible principle, (2) entails (3); so accepting (1) and (2) would
lead to accepting (1) and (3); i. e., we would contradict ourselves.
18 Brian Loar (1987, p. 170) agrees: "Kripke is surely right that our ordinary prin-
ciples imply that (1) and (2) are both true".
19 I use the expression "assenting to sentence s" in this paper as a technical umbrella
term for all pertinent linguistic acts like answering the question "s?" affirmatively,
asserting that p (where "p" refers to the propositional content of the utterance of s
in the circumstances), denying the claim that non-p, etc.
20 This claim is defended in Kemmerling (1993, 104ff.) and in a different way in
Kemmerling (2003, 214ff.).
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pretty is not a plausible candidate. If Pierre had it, it would be very
hard to account for the fact that he, anormal speaker who is capable of
expressing indefinitely many of his beliefs, cannot express this one un-
exciting belief by using the linguistic means at his disposal which are
most appropriate for expressing it. The most straightforward explana-
tion seems that he does not have it. This is clearly not a compelling
argument against the flrst option. N evertheless, I shallleave the first
option aside as clearly in need of defence, shifting the onus of argument
to whomever wants to defend it.-So what about the second option?
Clearly, it looks harsh to deny Pierre the belief that London is not
pretty. (But nota bene: the denial is very specific and restricted. It con-
cerns nothing but exaccly this one belief; there is no reason to deny
Pierre similar beliefs, as, e.g., the belief that the city he lives in is not
pretty, or the belief that London has turned out to be not pretty. Pierre
may well express these similar beliefs; he has no counter-dispositions
which would stand in the way.) Denying him the belief has trouble-
some consequences. For if he doesn't have this belief, it appears that he
does not know, neither understand nor mean what he says when he
sincerely assents to "London is not pretty", given that what he thereby
says is that London is not pretty. So maybe in assenting he doesn't
even say that ? But then his status as anormal speaker is endangered,
and this consequence runs against Kripke's presupposition that he is a
normal speaker. We have accepted this presupposition and therefore
should not deny that what he says by assenting to the sentence is that
London is not pretty.
But we do not have to deny this. For his being anormal speaker
(who says that p in assenting to "pj is quite compatible with the fact
that he does not always fully know, understand and mean what he
says. The conceptual connections between (sincerely) saying that p,
knowing ( or understanding) what one says and meaning that p are loose
enough to allow for occasional exceptions. The relevant principles ( e.g.,
"If anormal speaker sincerely says that p, then, ceteris paribus, he means
that p") contain a ceteris paribus qualification, and in Pierre's case of
saying that London is not pretty, this qualification, again, is not ful-
filled.-It seems that even though it is prima facie not an attractive move,
we may in all consistency deny that Pierre believes that London is not
pretty (and analogously that he believes that London is pretty).
Since this line of reasoning applies to Pierre both as anormal speaker
ofEnglish and as anormal speaker ofFrench, we have reason-although
not compelling reason-to reject claims (1) and (2) and to accept claims
(3) and (4). It is clear whv the reasoning hinted at here is far from being
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compelling: There are no basic principles of belief denial to the effect
that if someone, even by employing the optimal means to this effect, is
not capable of expressing the belief that p, he does not believe that p.
We have no principled justification for claiming that Pierre does not
have these beliefs, but only considerations which are defeasible and
may seem far-fetched.
The upshot of all this so far is this: In the light of what Kripke tells
us about Pierre, we are in a position to make a definite claim that there
is no principled justification for accepting any of the statements (1 )-
(4). As regards the truth value of these statements, we cannot make
any definite claim, although the considerations just presented provide
some reason-if no "knock-down arguments"-to reject statements (1 )
and (2), and to accept (3) and (4).
At one point, Kripke says that the puzzle is this: "Does Pierre, or
does he not, believe that London is pretty ?"21 Well, if this is the puzzle,
then the solution may be this: He does not believe it. We have no prin-
cipled justification for this answer, but it may turn out to be the best
one, all things considered. Alternatively, we may be content to say that
Kripke's story does not contain sufficient information for considered
judgments about the truth values of (1)-(4).22
4. A taxonomical suggestion
In the foregoing, I assumed that the disquotational principle, as devised
by Kripke, needs to be corrected by adding a ceteris panbus clause. The
only reason I have given so far for this claim is that all such principles
require such qualification. But I have left unspecified what marks out
the class ( or family) of "all such " principles. So let me turn to this ques-
tion.
In this section, I shall propose a taxonomy of the generalizations in
question. In the next section, I shall argue that the disquotational prin-
ciple belongs in the category of those generalizations of which it is char-
acteristic that they contain a ceteris panbus qualification essentially.
21 Kripke (1979), p. 259.
22 As to the Peter/Paderewski case which is introduced by Kripke (1979) later on in
the paper (p. 265f.), it should be noted that the disquotational principle cannot be
applied in the first place. For Peter, as described byKripke, ought not, on reflection,
assent to "Paderewski had musical talent" at a11. If he is asked to assent or dissent to
this sentence, then, on appropriate reflection, he wi1l do neither. He wi11 first want
to inquire which Paderewski is at issue. That is to say, Peter does not satisfy the
~".A~A-1A". ~+ .\'A -1;0~,.~.~.;~"~ 1 ~r;"~;~IA
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The generalizations which I have in mind are those which concern
the connections between normal people's states of minds, their
behaviour (including actions) and features of situations in which they
find themselves. Such generalizations can be exhaustively divided, in a
philosophically instructive way, into four categories. I shall proceed by
giving examples. (As regards one of these categories, I can give no ex-
amples; I presume it has no members which are known to us.) Let me
try to explain what I have in mind.
The first category contains statements like the following:
If x remembers that p, x has not forgotten that p.
If x believes that p, x holds true that p.
If x hopes that p, x wishes that p.
If x regrets that p, x believes that p.
If x knows that p, it is true that p.
These are straightforward trivialities which do not require a ceteris paribus
qualification. They are unassailable analytic truths in the traditional sense
of being a priori necessities, knowable to be true in virtue of linguistic
competence concerning the words contained in them. I shall call this
the Lexical category.
Another category, which I dub the Empirical, contains generaliza-
tions like these:
If x abhors y, then x does not like to think about y.
If x is in noisy surroundings, x fmds it hard to concentrate continu-
ously.
If x is drunk, x's reactions are slowed.
Generalizations of this type require, I presume, the insertion of a ceteris
paribus clause in order to sound feasible at all. But even when this quali-
fication is added, they are clearly not analytic or conceptual truths.
Consider the first example, with the qualification added:
If x abhors y, then x, ceteris paribus, does not like to think about y.
Let's assume that this is true. But even on this assumption it is still
possible that normal people are, or could become, different in this re-
spect: i. e., it is possible that in normal conditions they like thinking
about what they abhor. The generalization stays contingent, even un-
der the ceteris paribus qualification. (This category divides into two sub-
categories: one which is designed to contain empirical generalizations
without a ceteris paribus qualification, the other those which have such
a Qualification.)
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Now here come some examples of generalizations which (as soon
as they are qualified by a ceteris paribus clause) I propose to subsume
under the third category which I shall ca1l the Conceptual category:
If x wants y, thinks he can easily get y, and thinks that getting y is
O.K., x tries to get y.
If x te1ls y that p, x intends y to believe that x believes that p.
If x believes that p wi1l come about only if he does y, and if he desires
that p, and if he believes that his doing y does not have any disad-
vantages which would outweigh the advantages of its being the
case that p, then he wi11 try to do y.
If x fears y, then x tries to avoid y.
Generalizations of this type we do not take, on reflection, to be
exceptionless. (And if, unbeknownst to us, some of them were
exceptionless, we would have no reason to believe so.) Without a ceteris
paribus qualification, i. e., as statements of unrestritted generality, they
are, for a1l we know, at best defeasible claims; some of them we even
know to be false. But as soon as this qualification is added, they be-
come conceptual truths, if they are true at a1l. It is, for example, not a
contingent fact about the psychology of normal human beings that if
they want something ( and ...), they, ceteris paribus, try to get it. That
normal people standardly (under normal conditions) could be or be-
come different in this respect, is not a possibility. Our concepts of want-
ing something and trying to get something would have to be changed,
if we were to a1low for the possibility that normal people did not, in
overa1l normal conditions, try to get what they want, given they think
that getting it is easy and O.K. So in a case in which, for a1l we know,
the antecedent of such a generalization is fulfi1led but its consequent is
not, we are justified a priori to conclude that some abnormality has
arisen. It is part of our mastery of the relevant concepts, contained in
such generalizations, that we do not accept any possible case as a genu-
ine falsification of any of those generalizations.- These generalizations,
when explicitly qualified by a general normality constraint, are analytic
truths, but without such a qualification they would not be analytically
true, and many of them would not be true at a1l.
It is quite clear that there is little hope of ever devising clear cut tests
which would a1low us definitely to assign every pertinent and true gen-
eralization to exactly one of them. But nevertheless, it is equa1ly clear
that these generalizations are so different in kind that it is a good idea
to categorise them :
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the Lexical category is for analytic generalizations which require no
ceteris paribus clause;
the Empirical category is for contingent generalizations with or with-
out a ceteris paribus clause (if they contain such a clause, they are
still contingent);
the Conceptual category is for analytic generalizations which are con-
ceptually true exactly because they contain a ceteris paribus clause
(i. e., if they are true, they are necessarily true; but if the clause is
dropped, the result may be false).
I set out a simple schema below of the taxonomy I want to suggest.
Think of all those true generalizations (in standard English) which con-
cern the interrelationships between normal people's mental states, and
the connections between their mental states, the circumstances in which
they fmd themselves, and their behaviour. (It should in no way be as-
sumed that generalizations of this kind are, or may serve as, laws of the
special sciences or of commonsense psychology.23) They can be di-
vided into those generalizations which contain a ceteris paribus qualifi-
cation and those which do not. Both categories can be divided again
into contingent and necessary. Schematically, we get this:24
23 It may weIl be true, as, e. g., Earrnan/Roberts (1999) argue, that w hat are called
ceteris paribus laws in the special sciences really are vague claims of "work-in-progress
theories" (p. 471) and "belong to the context of discovery rather than the context
of justification" (p. 466). It may even be true, as, e. g., Keil (2005) argues that there
are no such things as ceteris paribus laws at all. And Schiffer (1991) may be right in
conceding that there are true propositions expressed by ceteris paribus sentences of
commonsense psychology and yet doubting that there are commonsense psycho-
logical ceteris paribus laws. All I shall presuppose here is that there are true general
sentences of the type under consideration.
24 This schema would need refinement, if there were generalizations which are a priori
and not necessarv. or a Posteriori and necessarv. But I know of no such examples.
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A few more remarks about these categories. The Lexical category con-
sists of generalizations which for the most part will be too trivial to
elucidate the concepts involved. N ormally, any attempt at denying one
of them would raise serious doubts about having mastered the linguis-
tic meaning of all words contained in the generalization.-Leaving vacu-
ously true generalizations aside, the category dubbed Empiricall prob-
ably does not contain a single member which we know to belong in
this category. The examples given above require a ceteris paribus quali-
fication, and hence belong to the category dubbed Empiricalz.
The generalizations to be subsumed under the category Conceptual
may be called cp necessities. They are not only true but unassailably
true (a priori recognizable as necessary) as they stand, yet without their
requirement of overall normality they inevitably turn into falsehoods
or at least into defeasible statements (a priori recognizable as not neces-
sary). I want to note two things which are remarkable about cp neces-
sities: their embedded generalizations, though contingent, are different
trom standard empirical generalizations; and the normality-operator
functions in a peculiar way when applied to these special generaliza-
tions. For the ease of discussion, let us describe their form, crudely, as
Given overall normal conditions: whenever A. B
or even more crudely as
cp (A -+ B).
And let us still concentrate only on necessarily true statements of this
type. As to the first point, the unqualified generalization contained in
cp-necessities is different from empirical generalizations with respect to
an important modal feature: '~ -+ B "is contingent, but not thoroughly
contingent. (A generalization is thoroughly contingent, if it is possibly
true and it is possibly false even when its antecedent is realized in nor-
mal circumstances.) "A -+ B", if true, cannot be false in cases in which
overall normal conditions obtain. Therefore, '~ -+ B" is not a thor-
oughly contingent generalization. If such an unqualified generalization
is true, its being true is, of course, a contingent fact; yet the generaliza-
tion itself is not thoroughly contingent. This modal feature of " A -+ B "
is well captured by the qualified generalization, "cp (A -+ B) ", which
entails its necessity, and therefore rules out the possibility that '~ -+ B "
is false in overall normal circumstances.
Secondly, it is worth emphasising how drastically the normality con-
straint, as used in cp necessities, differs from its use in empirical gener-
alizations. "cp (A ~ B) ", if it is a generalization of this type, is a priori
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recognizable as a necessary truth, although '~ ~ B»may be known to
be false. Hence in cp necessary statements, the semantic tie between
"overall normality" and the words contained in "Whenever A, B" has
to be of a very special sort, quite different in kind from what we find in
generalizations in the Empiricall category. Many scientifically minded
people will be inclined to detest any non-negating operator which is
able to transform known falsehoods into conceptual truths. Certainly,
this transformation is a remarkable feat. But it is not performed by the
cp-operator alone, but rather in semantic cooperation with the specific
vocabulary contained in « A » and «B ». The right kind of semantic inter-
play is clearly needed, for in its usual applications in science, the cp-
operator does not have the magical power to transform falsified or fal-
sifiable generalizations into unassailably true ones, but only the quite
unexciting power to transform them into generalizations which are
harder, though not impossible, to falsify. One may suspect that the vo-
cabulary needed for the normality-operator to develop its wondrous
powers, is the vocabulary of so-called "folk psychology", "folk-ethics",
"folk-aesthetics", etc. (If cp necessary generalizations form the core of
so-called "folk psychology", it is little surprise that folk psychology is
nauseating for anyone who wants to construe it as an empirical theory.)
All of the unqualified generalizations of true cp necessities may be
actually false, so the cp necessities are true in virtue of their normality-
constraint and how it semantically interacts with the vocabulary of what
follows them. Since they are conceptual truths irrespective of the truth
value of the generalization contained in them, I shall say that cp neces-
sities contain their normality-constraint essentially.
5. Why the Disquotational Principle requires
a ceteris paribus qualification
Now let us ask to which of these categories the following principle,
(P), which is a reformulation of Kripke's original version of the
disquotational principle, should be assigned:
(P) If x (a normal English speaker), on reflection, sincerely assents
to "p" ( an appropriate English sentence ), then x believes that p.
Let us pretend that (P) is true as it stands. Then it would have to be-
long either to the Lexical category or to the Empirica4 category. If it
belonged to the latter, then it would have to be a contingent truth, and
therefore possibly false. At the same time it is not possible that (P) is
false in normal cases. It is not possible, that is to say, that normal speakers
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who, on reflection, sincerely assent to some sentence oftheir language
in overall normal circumstances do not believe what they thereby say.
To put (P) in the Empiricall category is to ignore this modal fact.
May (P) belong to the Lexical category? Clearly not. For even if (P)
were true, it would not be a trivial truth to be accepted as self-evident
by any competent speaker. (P), even if it were true, would not be ana-
lytic in the blatant way which is characteristic of the members of the
Lexical category. (P), as it stands, is, I presume, something which is
held to be in principle defeasible or contestable by most normal speak-
ers}5 Anormal speaker who perfectly understands the linguistic meaning
of (P), a speaker who knows the meanings of all expressions involved
and who understands the semantic contribution of the grammatical
structure, may nevertheless have, or come to have, second thoughts
about the truth of (P). (P), unlike for example trivial analytic truths like
"He who believes something, holds it true", does not demand the un-
qualified assent of anybody who deserves to be regarded as anormal
speaker of English. Why then do some people tend to think of (P) as a
Lexical truth? The reason may be this: They confuse (P)'s being not
thoroughly contingent with its not being contingent; or they tacitly
assurne that (P) is meant to cover only normal cases, i. e., they read (P)
as if it contained a ceteris paribus clause.
If (P) is qualified by a normality constraint, the resulting modified
disquotational principle, (Cp-P), cannot be subsumed under the Em-
pirical2category. The reason is this.1f (Cp-P) were contingent, then its
negation would have to be possible. But then it would have to be pOS-
sible that, given overall nonnal conditions, anormal speaker assents to
"p" while not believing that p. Again, this is not a possibility our con-
cepts of normality, assent and belief would allow for.
Therefore, if (Cp-P) belongs to one of the categories, it belongs to
the one I have dubbed the Conceptual. Subsuming (Cp-P) under this
category immediately accounts for the modal fact mentioned above: It
is not possible that normal speakers who, on reflection, sincerely as-
sent to some sentence of their language under overall normal condi-
tions do not believe what they say in their assentings.
It may be asked whether it belongs to any these categories. I cer-
tainly think so. But this assumption is not beyond any reasonable doubt.
For one thing, there is the possibility that this vaguely sketched typol-
25 Even Kripke (1979, p. 249) seems to admit this, when he says: "I fear that even
with all this [i.e. 'nonnal speaker', 'on reflection' and 'sincerely', A.K.] it is pOS-
sible that some astute reader. ..may discover a qualification I have overlooked,
without which the asserted principle is subject o counterexample".
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ogy of generalizations fails in some grand, principled way, as some natu-
ralist philosophers (and anyone else who altogether rejects the idea of
conceptual truths) would certainly be inclined to object. But I shall not
go into this. Rather I shall assume without argument that the four cat-
egories which I have introduced could be specified sufficiently clearly
and distinctly, and conclude my sketch of the argument by repeating
its conclusion: Kripke's disquotational principle has to be modified,
and its modified version belongs to a category of generalizations of
which it is characteristic that if they are true, they are conceptual truths
containing a ceteris paribus qualification essentially.
6. Kripke's argument against (3)
In conclusion, I want to consider the objections which Kripke raises
against two claims which are at least tenable, as I argued in section 3
above, namely,
(3) Pierre does not believe that London is pretty.
( 4) Pierre does not believe that London is not pretty.
Against (3), Kripke argues as follows: "It seems undeniable that Pierre
once believed that London is pretty-at least before he leamed English".26
We should clearly accept this much. Kripke goes on:
Should we say that Pierre, now that he lives in London and speaks English, no
longer believes that London is pretty ? Well unquestionably Pierre once believed
that London is pretty. So we would be forced to say that Pierre has changed his
mind, has given up his previous belief27
No, we are not forced to say such a thing; we may say instead that he
has lost his previous belief without being aware of this fact. Kripke
continues :
But has he really done so ? Pierre is very set in his ways. He reiterates, with vigor,
every assertion he has ever made in French. He says he has not changed his mind
about anything, has not given up any belief. Can we say he is wrong about this? If
we did not have the story of his living in London and his English utterances, on the
basis of his normal command ofFrench we would beforcedto conclude that he still
believes that London is pretty. And it does seem that this is correct. Pierre has
neither changed his mind nor given up any belief he had in France.28
26 Kripke (1979), p. 256.
27 Kripke (1979), p. 256.
28 Kripke (1979), p. 256.
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Well, it should be conceded that Pierre has not changed his mind; to
say that would be to misdescribe w hat happened to hirn. If giving up a
belief requires being conscious of doing so, then, again, it would be a
misdescription of w hat happened to Pierre's belief that London is pretty
to characterize it as one which he has given up. But nevertheless, Pierre
has lost this belief. Pierre's averring that he still believes everything he
believed in France is irrelevant; he has no special authority about this}9
He may be prepared to assent to every French sentence he assented to
when he lived in France, in which case he would not have lost any
relevant disposition. But this does of course not show that his assent
today is an expression of the same belief as it used to be. The problem
with hirn is that in the meantirne he has acquired other relevant dispo-
sitions-new dispositions which have an influence exactly on the ex-
pressive power of his current assentings. Kripke's considerations con-
tain nothing to refute this point.
7. Kripke's argument against (4)
Finally, let's turn to Kripke's objection against the claim that Pierre
does not believe that London is not pretty.
Simi1ar difficulties beset any attempt to deny him his new belief. His French past
aside, he is just like his friends in London. Anyone else, growing up in London
with the same knowledge and beliefs that he expresses in England, we would un-
doubtedly judge to believe that London is not pretty. Can Pierre's French past
nullify such a judgement? Can we say that Pierre, because of his French past, does
not believe that [London is not pretty] ?30
Well, this is the wrong question to ask at this point. For it is not Pierre's
French past which is important, it is his present disposition to assent to
'1.ondres est jolie » and his present status as anormal speaker of French.
Kripke goes on:
Suppose an electric shock wiped out all his memories of the French language, what
he learned in France, and his French past. He would then be exactly like his neigh-
bors in London. He would have the same knowledge, beliefs, and linguistic capaci-
ties. We then presumably would be forced to say that Pierre believes that London is
ugly if we say it of his neighbors. But surely no shock that destroys part of Pierre's
memories and knowledge can give him a new belief. IfPierre believes [that London
29 Does Pierre lack the kind of self-knowledge which nonnal people have about their
current beliefs? Does he think that he has a certain belief which in fact he doesn't
have ? Or does he have a belief of which he thinks that he doesn't have it ? I have
argued that no such conclusion can be drawn in Kemmerling (2005).
30 Kripke (1979), pp. 256f.
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is not pretty] afterthe shock, he believed it before, despite his French language and
background.31
This last remark seems to be just wrong. If after the shock Pierre has
lost his disposition to assent to "Londres est jolie ", then the trouble-
maker is gone, and his assent to "London is not pretty" acquires fuIl
expressive power. Now, in the absence of counter-dispositions, the
disquotational principle can be applied, in good faith, to assenting Pierre
as to a case in which, as far as we can teIl, cetera are paria. Again, Kripke's
considerations contain nothing to refute this point.
8. Conclusion
So one lesson which may be learnt from considering Kripke's puzzle
about Pierre concerns the disquotational principle. It should be im-
proved. This could be done by adding two items: first, a clause which
explicitly excludes counter-dispositions; secondly, a ceteris panbus quali-
fication in order to exclude future counter-examples:
If anormal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to 'p "and
has no counter-dispositions, then, ceteris panbus, he believes that p.
Alternatively, we might rather formulate the principle simply as follows:
If anormal English speaker assents to 'p ", then, ceteris panbus, he
believes that p
and collect on aseparate list those features which we have recognized up to
date as violating the principle' s overall normality constraint ( i. e. : insincerity,
rashness, linguistic or conceptual confusion, and counter-disposedness) .
Let me emphasise that the ceteris panbus clause must. stay. Adding
merely the constraint concerning counter-dispositions would not do.
Without the ceteris panbus clause, even the enriched principle would
be nothing but a defeasible generalization awaiting another counter-
example.32 We have no reason to assume that our current list of rel-
evant abnormalities is complete. As a conceptual generalization, the
principle requires the cetens panbus clause essentially. "Taken in its ob-
vious intent, after all, the principle appears to be a self-evident truth",
says Kripke.33 I agree, and would add: Taken in its obvious intent, the
31 Kripke (1979), p. 257.
32 J.G. Moore's (1999) examples for what he calls cases of "misdisquotation" might
be considered further counter-examples against the "final" version of the principle
if it were stated without the cp-clause.
33 Kripke (1979), p. 249.
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principle contains a normality constraint which we tend to overlook
only because it goes without saying.
The requirement concerning overall normality which is articulated
in the ceteris paribus clause is not a particularly precise constraint. But
we should, I think, not complain about this. It seems to be a fact about
our practice of belief ascription which several authors have noted.
J. G. Moore thinks that "we cannot [ ...] articulate a steadfast disquota-
tion principle that is at once precise, theoretically useful, and also non-
controversially true".34 And with regard to Kripke's unqualified
disquotational principle, J. I. Biro has noted that "there is no question
but that we observe caution in our use of disquotation in everyday
interpretation".35 I agree with both claims. The occurrence of the ceteris
paribus clause in the modification of the principle suggested in this pa-
per can be looked upon as a way of making explicit the source and the
sort of imprecision which is a characteristic feature of the disquotation
principle; at the same time, it is an essential part of what makes this
principle non-controversially true. Moreover, the occurrence of this
clause is an apt reminder that we should observe caution in our use of
the principle.
I have not tried to inquire into what exactly are the philosophical
points that Kripke wanted to make by his discussion of Pierre's case.
But if part of his intention was to reveal how, in cases which are clearly
possible, the principles underlying our common practice of belief as-
cription "are questionable"36, how they lead into grave difficulties (how
we are forced by them, all too easily, to ascribe contradictory beliefs,
and even to contradict ourselves), then I think that he has not shown








34 Moore (1999), pp. 362 f.
35 Biro (1984), p. 281.
36 Kripke (1979), p. 268.
37 Thanks to Tyler Burge, Gerhard Ernst, Mark He1me, Nikola Kompa, Götz Klages,
Wo1fgang Künne, Brian Loar, Tobias Rosefeldt, Eike von Savigny, Wo1fgang Spohn
and Stephen Schiffer for helpful, even if incredulous, comments on earlier versions
of this paper. Special thanks to Fred Dretske for encouragement.
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